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Abstract. We study the problem to find a partition of a graph G with
maximum social welfare based on social distance between vertices in G,
called MaxSWP. This problem is known to be NP-hard in general. In this
paper, we first give a complete characterization of optimal partitions of
trees with small diameters. Then, by utilizing these results, we show that
MaxSWP can be solved in linear time for trees. Moreover, we show that
MaxSWP is NP-hard even for 4-regular graphs.
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1 Introduction
With the development of Social Networking Services (SNS) such as Twitter,
Facebook, Instagram and so on, it has become much easier than before to obtain
graphs that represent human relationship, and there are many attempts to
utilize such graphs for extracting useful information. Among them, grouping
people according to the graph structures is focused and investigated from many
standpoints. For example, if a community consisting of members with a common
interest is found, advertising or promoting some products might be very effective
for members of the community due to the strong interest.
Here, there are roughly two standpoints how we group communities. One is
context based grouping, and the other is based on link structures. Previous work
on community detection and grouping based on graph structure is summarized
in [5,7,11], for example.
Basically, these studies formulate network structure identification (community
detection, grouping, and partition) as an optimization problem (sometimes it is
not explicitly conscious), and design a fast algorithm to (approximately) solve
the optimization problem. Then, network structures to identify are obtained
as outputs of the proposed algorithm. Here, network structures to identify are
? This work is supported by JSPS KAKENHI Grant Numbers 17K19960, 17H01698,
18H06469.
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already abstract, e.g., dense subgraphs; the proposed algorithm can be used not
only for the original purpose but also other purposes. In fact, [12] is originally
about boundary line detection in image data, but the proposed techniques are
used for community detentions (e.g., [8]), and it is further used for the detection
of industrial clusters in economic networks [6]. As above, the versatility of
“optimization problems” is very useful. However, we may think that they do not
best utilize the features or characteristics of the target network. For example, the
criteria for group partition, image processing, and detecting industrial clusters in
economic networks could be different. In other words, we might expect a better
performance by considering an optimization problem specialized for community
detection.
From these, we consider the problem for group partition (or simply say
partition) in networks (graphs), taking into account the characteristics of SNS.
In SNS, people communicate and exchange information with also a person who
is not directly acquainted, i.e., followers. That is, in SNS, not only members
with direct connections but also members without direct connections are loosely
connected, which enables us to share information widely. Here, “looseness” is
related to the degree of sharing information, and it is natural to define it as the
distance (i.e., the length of a shortest path) between the persons on the network.
Based on such observation, Branzei et al. introduced a new grouping scale
for human relations networks [4]. The definition of the utility in [4] is as follows:
given a partition, the utility of an individual is defined as the sum of reciprocal
distances to other people in the same coalition divided by the size of the coalition.
Based on this, the social welfare of a partition is also defined as the sum of the
utilities of all the members. Unfortunately, finding a partition with maximum
social welfare (MaxSWP) is known to be NP-hard even on graphs with maximum
degree 6 [3].
Also, the characterizations of optimal partitions are known only for trivial
cases such as complete graphs and complete bipartite graphs [4]. Even for trees,
it is not known whether MaxSWP can be solved in polynomial time. One of
the reasons seems to be the objective function of MaxSWP. In a typical graph
optimization problem, the objective function often forms a linear sum of weights,
whereas the one of MaxSWP takes the form of a nonlinear function, which is the
sum of the reciprocal distances.
1.1 Our contribution
In this paper, we mainly study finding an optimal partition with social distance of
a tree, which is one of the most basic and important structures in graph algorithm
design. In the process of research, we first give a complete characterization of
optimal partitions of paths. Although the argument is simple, it gives an insight
about the hardness related to the nonlinearity of the utility and the social
welfare. Next, we give a similar characterization of optimal partitions of trees.
In the characterization, we find out sub-trees with small diameters appeared in
optimal partitions of trees. By using the characterization, we design a linear-
time algorithm for computing an optimal partition of a tree. Finally, we show
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that MaxSWP is NP-hard even for 4-regular graphs. This result strengthens the
previous work for graphs with maximum degree 6 [3].
1.2 Related work
Graph partition is one of the most basic and important problem in computer
science and there are many studies about graph partition in various contexts,
such as image processing and cluster analysis [12,5,7,11,6].
Graph partition with social distance has been studied in the context of
coalition formation games [4]. In coalition formation games, each player has the
utility based on the preference for other players in the same coalition. Intuitively,
a player is happy if the utility is high, that is, there are many players he/she
prefer in the same coalition. In the field of coalition formation games, many
researchers study about desirable coalition formations, namely, partitions, in
terms of maximum social welfare, stability, and core [1,10]. Furthermore, the
price of anarchy (PoA) and the price of stability (PoS) are also well-studied for
evaluating agents systems [2]. The PoA or PoS are more related to this paper
because they are defined as the maximum and minimum ratio between a Nash
stable solution and the best solution, respectively.
In coalition formation games on graphs, there are many utility functions
for agents. For example, in [1,13], the utility of an agent is defined as the sum
of edge-weights between him/her and other agents in the same coalition. The
weight of an edge represents the strength of the relationship between agents.
In social distance games, the utility is defined as the harmonic function of the
distance between agents. This is based on the concept of the closeness centrality,
which is one of classical measures for network analysis [4,3]. As mentioned above,
finding the best partition, that is, a partition with maximum social welfare is
NP-hard even on graphs with maximum degree 6 [3]. On the other hand, there is
a 2-approximaiton algorithm for finding such a partition [4].
The organization of this paper is as follows. In Section 2, we give basic
terminologies, notation, and definitions. In Section 3, we give a complete charac-
terization of optimal partitions of paths. In Section 4, we propose a linear-time
algorithm for MaxSWP on trees. Finally, we show that MaxSWP is NP-hard even
on 4-regular graphs in Section 5. Due to the space limitation, we out the proofs
of propositions lemmas and theorems marked with (*). The detailed profs can be
found in Appendix.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Terminologies
We use standard terminologies on graph theory. Let G = (V (G), E(G)) be a
simple, connected, and undirected graph. For simplicity, we may denote V (G)
and E(G) by V and E, respectively. We also denote the number of vertices and
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edges by n and m, respectively. A path from u to v of minimum length is called a
shortest path, and the length is denoted by distG(u, v). In a graph G, if there is no
path from the vertex u to the vertex v, we define distG(u, v) =∞. Let G[C] be
the subgraph induced by vertex set C ⊆ V . We sometimes denote distG[C](u, v)
of u, v ∈ C in G[C] by distC(u, v) for simplicity. For graph G, we denote the
diameter of G by diam(G) = maxu,v∈V,u6=v distG(u, v). For a vertex v, we denote
the set of neighbors of v by N(v) = {u | (u, v) ∈ E} ⊆ V . We also define the
degree of v as d(v) = |N(v)|. For G = (V,E), we denote the maximum degree of
G by ∆(G) = maxv∈V d(v). For simplicity, we sometimes denote it by ∆. For a
positive integer n, we define [n] = {1, . . . , n}.
A graph G = (V,E) is called a path graph denoted by Pn if E = {(vi, vi+1) |
1 ≤ i < n}. We also sometimes simply call it a path. Moreover, if E = {(v1, vi) |
2 ≤ i ≤ n}, G is said to be a star and denoted by K1,n−1. A graph G is a tree if
G is connected and it has no cycle. We denote an n-vertex tree by Tn. Moreover,
we denote a tree with the diameter d by T dn .
2.2 Coalition and Utility
The definitions here are based on [4]. Given a graph G = (V,E) and C ⊆ V , we
define the utility U(v, C) of a vertex v ∈ C as follows:
U(v, C) = 1|C|
∑
u∈C\{v}
1
distG[C](v, u)
.
By the definition, it satisfies that 0 ≤ U(v, C) ≤ 1. In a graph G = (V,E), a
partition of G is defined as the family of sets of vertices C = {C1, . . . , Ck}, where
C1 ∪ · · · ∪ Ck = V and Ci ∩ Cj = ∅ for i 6= j ∈ [k]. Moreover, C ∈ C is called
a coalition of partition C. In particular, if C = {V }, C is called the grand of G
and V is called the grand coalition. If {v} ∈ C for a vertex v ∈ V , v is said to
be an isolated vertex of partition C. We define the utility of an isolated vertex
as U(v, {v}) = 0. Next, we define the social welfare of a partition C in graph G
as follows. We define the social welfare ϕ(G, C) of partition C in G = (V,E) as
follows:
ϕ(G, C) =
∑
C∈C
∑
v∈C
U(v, C).
If C is the grand of G, that is, C = {V }, we simply denote ϕ(G, {V }) by ϕ(G).
We can observe that ϕ(G, C) is bounded by n−1. Moreover, we define the average
social welfare ϕ˜(G, C) for partition C in G. The average social welfare of partition
C in G = (V,E) is defined as follows:
ϕ˜(G, C) = ϕ(G, C)|V | .
If C is the grand of G, that is, C = {V }, we simply denote ϕ˜(G, {V }) by ϕ˜(G).
Finally, we define a partition C∗ with maximum social welfare in graph G. A
partition C∗ is maximum if it satisfies that ϕ(G, C∗) ≥ ϕ(G, C) for any partition
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C in G. We call the problem of finding a partition with maximum social welfare
MaxSWP. We also call an optimal solution of MaxSWP an optimal partition.
In previous work, it is shown that MaxSWP is NP-hard even for graphs with
maximum degree 6 [3]. On the other hand, it is known that the grand is the
only optimal partition of MaxSWP on complete graphs and complete bipartite
graphs [4].
Proposition 1 ([4]). On complete graphs and complete bipartite graphs, the
grand is the only optimal partition of MaxSWP.
Branzei et al. showed that there exists a partition where the utility of each vertex
v attains at least 1/2 and a polynomial-time algorithm that finds such a partition
for any graph [4].
Proposition 2 ([4]). There is a polynomial-time algorithm that finds a partition
such that each agent utility is at least 1/2 for any graph.
From Proposition 2, it can be easily seen that there exists a partition C that
satisfies ϕ(G, C) ≥ n/2. Thus, the social welfare of an optimal partition for any
graph is also at least n/2.
Corollary 1. Any optimal partition C∗ of graph G satisfies ϕ(G, C∗) ≥ n/2.
Since for any G and C, ϕ(G, C) is bounded by n− 1, the algorithm proposed by
Branzei et al. [4] is a 2-approximation algorithm. In the end of this section, we
give another property of an optimal partition of MaxSWP.
Proposition 3 (*). For each coalition C ∈ C∗ of optimal partition C∗, G[C] is
connected.
3 Optimal partition of a path
In this section, we characterize the optimal partition of a path Pn. In a path,
the subgraph induced by a coalition is also a path by Proposition 3. By using
this property and examining the average social welfare of Pn, we can identify the
graph structures of coalitions in the optimal partitions of Pn. In the following,
we first examine average social welfare of Pn. Then we give the optimal partition
of Pn.
Let h(k) =
∑k
i=1 1/i be the harmonic function for some positive integer
k. The social welfare and the average social welfare of Pn can be denoted by
ϕ(Pn) = (2
∑n−1
k=1 h(k))/n and ϕ˜(Pn) = (2
∑n−1
k=1 h(k))/n2, respectively. Then,
we obtain the following lemmas.
Lemma 1 (*). It holds that ϕ˜(P2) < ϕ˜(P3), and ϕ˜(Pn) > ϕ˜(Pn+1) for n ≥ 3.
Lemma 2 (*). For an optimal partition C∗ of a path Pn and a coalition C ∈ C∗,
G[C] is either P2, P3 or P4.
Finally, we give the optimal partition of Pn.
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Theorem 1 (*). The optimal partition of path Pn is
1. C∗ = {{v3i−2, v3i−1, v3i} | 1 ≤ i ≤ n/3} if n ≡ 0 (mod 3),
2. C∗ = {{v1, v2, v3, v4}, {v3i+2, v3i+3, v3i+4} | 1 ≤ i ≤ (n− 4)/3} if n ≡ 1
(mod 3), and
3. C∗ = {{v1, v2}, {v3i, v3i+1, v3i+2} | 1 ≤ i ≤ (n− 2)/3} or {{v1, v2, v3, v4},
{v5, v6, v7, v8}, {v3i+6, v3i+7, v3i+8} | 1 ≤ i ≤ (n− 8)/3
}
if n ≡ 2 (mod 3).
4 Optimal partition of a tree
In Section 3, we identified the optimal partition of MaxSWP on a path. In
this section, we consider MaxSWP on trees. Since a tree is more general and
complicated than a path and the optimal structure of MaxSWP is quite different
from typical graph optimization problems, MaxSWP is non-trivial even on trees.
To solve MaxSWP, we design an algorithm based on dynamic programming.
However, we do not know which information we keep track of in dynamic
programming since the optimal structure of MaxSWP is unknown. For this,
we identify the small coalitions in the optimal partition. According to Corollary 1,
if there is a coalition whose social welfare is less than n/2, it is not included
in the optimal partition since the social welfare can be increased by dividing
the coalition. Thus, we only keep track of the subgraph structures of coalitions
of social welfare at least n/2. We can identify such coalitions by calculating
the social welfare of each coalition. By using the subgraph structures of such
coalitions, we design a linear-time algorithm for MaxSWP on a tree based on
dynamic programming.
4.1 Social welfare of trees with small diameters
Since the utility of an agent is defined as the harmonic function with respect to
the distance to all others in the same coalition, the diameter of the subgraph
induced by each coalition affects the social welfare. Intuitively, the social welfare
of a subgraph with large diameter is very low in a tree because a tree is quite
sparse. Therefore, we characterize the subgraph structures of coalitions in the
optimal partition in terms of small diameters.
We first consider trees T≤2n with diameter at most 2. Such graphs are stars
denoted by K1,n−1. Since a star is a complete bipartite graph, it satisfies that
C∗ = {V } by Property 1. Here, we investigate the number of vertices of a star
that maximizes the average social welfare. This gives the upper bound of the
social welfare of T≤2n = K1,n−1.
Lemma 3 (*). For tree T≤2n with diameter at most 2, n/2 ≤ ϕ(T≤2n ) ≤ 9n/16
holds.
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Fig. 1. diameter 3 tree T 3n Fig. 2. diameter 4 tree T 4n
Next, we consider trees with diameter 3. Any tree with diameter 3 can be
represented as T 3n = (V (T 3n), E(T 3n)) where V (T 3n) = {u1, u2, s1, . . . , sk, t1, . . . , t`}
and E(T 3n) = (u1, u2) ∪ {(u1, si) | 1 ≤ i ≤ k} ∪ {(u2, tj) | 1 ≤ j ≤ `} for any
k, ` ≥ 1 (see Figure 1). Note that n = |V (T 3n)| = k + `+ 2. Then, the following
lemma holds.
Lemma 4 (*). For tree T 3n with diameter 3, if k = 2 and ` ≥ 7, k ≥ 7 and
` = 2, k > 3 and ` ≥ 3, or k ≥ 3 and ` > 3, ϕ(T 3n) < n/2 holds, and otherwise
ϕ(T 3n) ≥ n/2.
As with trees with diameter 3, we identify the types of trees with diameter 4
that satisfy ϕ(T 4n) ≥ n/2. Any tree with diameter 4 can be represented as T 4n =
(V (T 4n), E(T 4n)) where V (T 4n) = {v, u1, . . . , uk, w1,1, . . . , w1,`1 , . . . , wk,1, . . . , wk,`k}
for k ≥ 2 and `1, `2 ≥ 1, and E(T 4n) = {(v, ui) | 1 ≤ i ≤ k} ∪ {(ui, wi,j) | 1 ≤ i ≤
k, 1 ≤ j ≤ `k} (see Figure 2). For each i, `i represents the number of leaves of
ui. We denote the total number of leaves of T 4n by αk =
∑k
i=1 `i and then the
number of vertices of T 4n is represented as n = |V (T 4n)| = k + αk + 1. Then, we
obtain the following lemma.
Lemma 5 (*). For tree T 4n with diameter 4, ϕ(T 4n) ≥ n/2 holds if (k, αk) =
(2, 2), (2, 3), (3, 2), (4, 2), and otherwise ϕ(T 4n) < n/2 holds.
Finally, we show that the social welfare of the grand coalition of a tree with
diameter at least 5 is less than n/2.
Lemma 6 (*). For tree Tµn with diameter µ ≥ 5, ϕ(Tµn ) < n/2 holds.
By the above discussion, the optimal partition of a tree does not contain
not only coalitions with large diameters but also particular coalitions with small
diameters. In the following, we further refine the candidates for coalitions in the
optimal partition of a tree.
First, we show that any optimal partition does not contain a coalition that
consists of a tree with diameter 4. Thus, there is no coalition that consists of a
tree with diameter at least 4 in the optimal solution by Lemma 6.
Lemma 7 (*). Any optimal partition of a tree T does not contain a coalition
that consists of a tree T≥4 with diameter at least 4.
Moreover, we prove that the candidates for coalitions in the optimal partition
are only three types.
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Fig. 3. K1,|C|−1 Fig. 4. P4 Fig. 5. T 35
Lemma 8 (*). Let C∗ be the optimal partition of tree Tn. Then, the subgraph
G[C] induced by C ∈ C∗ is one of the following: (1) a star K1,|C|−1 (see Figure 3),
(2) a path P4 of length 3 (see Figure 4), and (3) a tree T 35 of size five with diameter
3 (see Figure 5).
4.2 Algorithm
In this section, we propose an algorithm that finds an optimal partition of a
tree in linear time. This algorithm is based on dynamic programing with keeping
track of the candidates identified by Lemma 8.
First, we introduce some notations to design our algorithm. Given a tree, we
root it at arbitrary vertex r. We denote a subtree whose root is v ∈ V by Tv and
its partition by Cv. For subtree Tv, we also denote the coalition including v by
Cv ∈ Cv.
By Lemma 8, the subgraph G[C] induced by coalition C ∈ C∗ is K1,|C|−1, P4
or T 35 . The algorithm recursively computes a partition of Tv which attains the
maximum social welfare for each v from the leaves of T .
Intuitively, our algorithm constructs coalitions in each step of dynamic pro-
gramming. For example, a vertex u is added a coalition as an isolated vertex in
Tu. In next step, vertex v must be added to the same coalition in Tv since the
optimal solution does not contain an isolated vertex. Here, we keep track of not
only coalition Cv, but also the position of v in the coalition since we compute a
coalition with maximum social welfare by combining sub-coalitions in subtrees
of Tv. For example, if v is positioned at a leaf of K1,f , it is combined with a
coalition that consists of K1,f−1. On the other hand, if v is positioned at the
center vertex of K1,f , it is combined with f coalitions that consist of isolated
vertices. Then we compute each coalition and sub-coalition with maximum social
welfare including a new vertex in next step again. Since the optimal partition
contains only coalitions of K1,|C|−1, P4 and T 35 , we keep track of coalition Cv
with the position of v that consists of them.
Let H be a subgraph induced by a coalition with the position of v. Then we
consider the following types of H:
1. H is an isolated vertex of v, denoted by H = ({v}, ∅),
2. H is a star K1,f and
(a) v is the center of K1,f , denoted by H = Kmid1,f ,
(b) v is a leaf of K1,f , denoted by H = Kleaf1,f ,
3. H is P4 and
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(a) v is a leaf of P4, denoted H = P leaf4 ,
(b) root v is not a leaf of P4, denoted by H = Pmid4 ,
4. H is T 35 and
(a) v is s1, denoted by H = T 35 (s1),
(b) v is t1 or t2, denoted by H = T 35 (t),
(c) v is u1, denoted by H = T 35 (u1),
(d) v is u2, denoted by H = T 35 (u2).
We can observe that connected proper subgraphs of T 35 are subgraphs of P4
and star K1,3. Also connected proper subgraphs of P4 are subgraphs of star K1,2.
Thus, by only keeping track of stars, we can treat P4 and so T 35 as seen later.
Let Gv be the set of above subgraphs with the position of v in Tv. For Tv,
we define the recursive formula ρ(v,H) = maxCv3Cv :G[Cv]=H ϕ(Tv, Cv) as the
maximum social welfare of the partition of Tv such that the subgraph induced by
coalition Cv including v is H ∈ Gv. We also define ρ(v) = maxH∈Gv ρ(v,H) as
the social welfare of the optimal partition of Tv. Then, the social welfare of the
optimal partition of T with root r is denoted by ρ(r) = maxH∈Gr ρ(r,H). Let wj
be the children of v where 1 ≤ j ≤ d(v)− 1 in Tv. Then, we define the recursive
formulas of ρ(v,H) for H ∈ Gv to compute ρ(r) as follows.
1. H is an isolated vertex ({v}, ∅)
If H = ({v}, ∅), ϕ(H) = 0. Since v separates trees Twj , ρ(v, ({v}, ∅)) is the
sum of the social welfare of the optimal partition in Twj . Thus, ρ(v, ({v}, ∅))
is defined as ρ(v, ({v}, ∅)) =∑d(v)−1j=1 ρ(wj).
2. H is a star K1,f
(a) H = Kmid1,f with center v
In this case, we include f children of v in coalition Cv. Note that f
children are isolated vertices in subtrees of Tv since Cv forms K1,f in Tv.
Let δj = ρ(wj)− ρ(wj , ({wj}, ∅)). Then δj means the difference between
the maximum social welfare in Twj and the maximum social welfare of the
partition such that wj is an isolated vertex in Twj . In other words, δj is the
cost to include wj in Cv. Thus, choosing the smallest f children of δj max-
imizes ρ(v,Kmid1,f (v)) since it consists of the social welfare of Cv, f optimal
partitions of Twj such that wj is an isolated vertex in Twj , and d(v)−1−f
optimal partitions of Twj . Let w1, w2, . . . , wf be such children, where the
indices are sorted in ascending order. Then, ρ(v,Kmid1,f (v)) is defined as
ρ(v,Kmid1,f (v)) = ϕ(K1,f ) +
∑f
j=1 ρ(wj , ({wj}, ∅)) +
∑d(v)
j=f+1 ρ(wj).
(b) H = Kleaf1,f with leaf v
Since Cv forms a star K1,f and v is a leaf of it in Tv, we include vertex v
in a coalition of K1,f−1 with center wk that is a child of v in a subtree Tk.
Thus, we need to choose such child wk that maximize the social welfare
of Tv. In this case, the maximum social welfare of Tv is the sum of the
social welfare of the optimal partition of subtrees Twj except for Twk ,
ϕ(K1,f ), and the social welfare of the partition of Twk such that wk is
the center of K1,f−1 of coalition Cwk minus ϕ(K1,f−1).
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Thus, ρ(v,Kleaf1,f ) is defined as follows:
ρ(v,Kleaf1,f ) = max
k∈[d(v)]
{ ∑
j∈[d(v)]\{k}
ρ(wj) + ϕ(K1,f ) + ρ(wk,Kmid1,f−1(wk))− ϕ(K1,f−1)
}
= max
k∈[d(v)]
{d(v)∑
j=1
ρ(wj)− ρ(wk) + ϕ(K1,f ) + ρ(wk,Kmid1,f−1)− ϕ(K1,f−1)
}
=
d(v)∑
j=1
ρ(wj) + ϕ(K1,f )− ϕ(K1,f−1) + max
k∈[d(v)]
{
ρ(wk,Kmid1,f−1)− ρ(wk)
}
.
We define ρ(v,H) for the rest of H ∈ Gv in the same way.
3. H is a path P4
(a) H = P leaf4 with leaf v
A path whose one of leaves is v consists of one P3 = K1,2 and v. Thus we
choose one child of v whose coalition is K1,2 and maximizes ρ(v, P leaf4 ).
ρ(v, P leaf4 ) =ϕ(P4)− ϕ(P3) +
d(v)∑
j=1
ρ(wj) + max
k∈[d(v)]
{
ρ(wk,Kleaf1,2 )− ρ(wk)
}
.
(b) H = Pmid4 with non-leaf v
A path whose one of non-leaf vertices is v consists of one P2 = K1,1, v,
and one isolated vertex. Thus we choose two children of v such that each
coalitions that includes them is K1,1 and an isolated vertex, respectively,
and they maximize ρ(v, Pmid4 ).
ρ(v, Pmid4 ) =ϕ(P4)− ϕ(P2) +
d(v)∑
j=1
ρ(wj)
+ max
a,b∈[d(v)],a 6=b
{
ρ(wa,Kleaf1,1 ) + ρ(wb, ({wb}, ∅))− ρ(wa)− ρ(wb)
}
.
4. H is a tree T 35
(a) H = T 35 (s1) with v = s1
Since v is s1 of T 35 in Tv, we combine K
leaf
1,3 whose leaf is a child wj of v
with v. Thus, we choose such a child of v that maximizes ρ(v, T 35 (s1)).
Then, ρ(v, T 35 (s1)) is defined as follows:
ρ(v, T 35 (s1)) = ϕ(T 35 )− ϕ(K1,3) +
d(v)∑
j=1
ρ(wj) + max
k∈[d(v)]
{
ρ(wk,Kleaf1,3 )− ρ(wk)
}
.
(b) H = T 35 (t) with v = t1 or t2
Since v is t1 or t2 of T 35 in Tv, we combine Pmid4 in a subtree Twj with
v. Thus, we choose such a child of v that maximizes ρ(v, T 35 (t)). Then,
ρ(v, T 35 (t)) is defined as follows:
ρ(v, T 35 (t)) = ϕ(T 35 )− ϕ(P4) +
d(v)∑
j=1
ρ(wj) + max
k∈[d(v)]
{
ρ(wk, Pmid4 )− ρ(wk)
}
.
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Fig. 6. Computing ρ(r0, H) for H = T 35 (u1)
(c) H = T 35 (u1) with v = u1
Since v is u1 of T 35 in Tv, we combine one coalition of K1,1 whose center
is a child of v, one coalition of an isolated vertex, and v to construct
coalition Cv. Thus, we choose two such children of v that maximizes
ρ(v, T 35 (u1)). Then, ρ(v, T 35 (u1)) is defined as follows:
ρ(v, T 35 (u1)) =ϕ(T 35 )− ϕ(P3) +
d(v)∑
j=1
ρ(wj)
+ max
a,b∈[d(v)],a6=b
{
ρ(wa,Kmid1,2 (wa)) + ρ(wb, ({wb}, ∅))− ρ(wa)− ρ(wb)
}
.
(d) H = T 35 (u2) with v = u2
Since v is u2 of T 35 in Tv, we combine one coalition of P2 whose leaf is a
child of v, two coalitions of isolated vertices, and v to construct coalition
Cv. Note that such P2 is a star Kleaf1,1 . Thus, we choose three such children
of v that maximizes ρ(v, T 35 (u2)). Then ρ(v, T 35 (u2)) is defined as follows:
ρ(v, T 35 (u2)) =ϕ(T 35 )− ϕ(Kleaf1,1 ) +
d(v)∑
j=1
ρ(wj)
+ max
a,b,c∈[d(v)],a6=b 6=c
{
ρ(wa,Kleaf1,1 ) + ρ(wb, ({wb}, ∅)) + ρ(wc, ({wc}, ∅))
− ρ(wa)− ρ(wb)− ρ(wc)
}
.
Figure 6 shows an example of computing ρ(r0, H) where H = T 35 (u1). To
compute ρ(r0, H), we use the ρ’s values of its subtrees. The pattern H = T 35 (u1)
contains one subtree with H = Kmid1,2 and one with H = {{v}, ∅}. The best
combination of these can be computed by the DP procedure (c) explained above.
Finally, we evaluate the running time of our algorithm. In Case 1, we can
compute the recursive formula in time O(d(v)). In Case 2, for case (a), we need
to compute largest ρ(v,Kmid1,f (v)) among f = 1, 2, . . . , d(v)− 1. This can be done
by a binary search with SELECT, since δi is increasing and wi’s utility in K1,f is
decreasing. We can find the optimal f in O(d(v)+d(v)/2+d(v)/4 · · · ) = O(d(v)).
Case (b) is also computable in the same running time. In Case 3, both cases can
be computed in time O(d(v)) by memorizing the best score among its children.
Finally, in Case 4, all the cases can be computed in O(d(v)) by a similar manner
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of Case 3. Thus the total running time of this algorithm is
∑
v∈V O(d(v)) = O(n),
since
∑
v∈V d(v) = 2|E| = 2(n− 1) holds for a tree by the handshaking lemma.
Hence, we obtain the following theorem.
Theorem 2. MaxSWP for a tree can be solved in linear time.
5 Hardness result of MaxSWP for 4-regular graphs
It is mentioned in [3] that MaxSWP is NP-hard for graphs with maximum degree
6, though the proof is omitted in the conference paper. Actually, we can show
a stronger result, that is, MaxSWP is NP-hard even for 4-regular graphs. The
proof is based on a reduction from a restricted variant of 3-SAT problem called
M3XSAT(3L), which is shown to be NP-complete in [9, Lemma 5].
Theorem 3 (*). MaxSWP is NP-hard even for 4-regular graphs.
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6 Omitted proof in Section 2
Proposition 3. For each coalition C ∈ C∗ of optimal partition C∗, G[C] is
connected.
Proof. Let C∗ be an optimal partition of G. Suppose that there is a coalition
C ∈ C∗ such that G[C] has at least two connected components. Note that
1 ≤ |C1|, |C2| < |C|. We also set C′ = C∗ \ {C} ∪ {C1, C2}. By using the fact that
|C1| < |C|, for any v ∈ C1 ∪ C it satisfies that
U(v, C) = 1|C|
∑
u∈C\{v}
1
distG[C](v, u)
= 1|C|
∑
u∈C1\{v}
1
distG[C](v, u)
<
1
|C1|
∑
u∈C1\{v}
1
distG[C1](v, u)
= U(v, C1).
In the same way, we obtain U(v, C) < U(v, C2) for any v ∈ C2 ∪ C1. Thus,∑
v∈C
U(v, C) =
∑
v∈C1
U(v, C) +
∑
v∈C2
U(v, C) <
∑
v∈C1
U(v, C1) +
∑
v∈C2
U(v, C2).
Let ϕ(G, C∗) be the social welfare of C∗ in G. Because the social welfare of C′ in
G is ϕ(G, C′) = ϕ(G, C∗)−∑v∈C U(v, C) +∑v∈C1 U(v, C1) +∑v∈C2 U(v, C2) ,
it holds that ϕ(G, C′) > ϕ(G, C∗). This contradicts that C∗ is optimal. uunionsq
7 Omitted proof in Section 3
Lemma 1. It holds that ϕ˜(P2) < ϕ˜(P3), and ϕ˜(Pn) > ϕ˜(Pn+1) for n ≥ 3.
Proof. First, we compute the average social welfare of Pn.
ϕ˜(Pn) =
2
n2
n−1∑
k=1
h(k) = 2
n2
( 1
n− 1 +
2
n− 2 + · · ·+
n− 1
1
)
= 2
n2
(
n− (n− 1)
n− 1 +
n− (n− 2)
n− 2 + · · ·+
n− 1
1
)
= 2
n2
(
n
n− 1 +
n
n− 2 + · · ·+
n
1 − 1 · (n− 1)
)
= 2
n2
(n · h(n− 1) + 1− n) .
14 M. Okubo et al.
Next, we consider the difference between ϕ˜(Pn+1) and ϕ˜(Pn).
ϕ˜(Pn+1)− ϕ˜(Pn)
= 2
n2(n+ 1)2
(
n2(n · h(n) + h(n)− n)− (n+ 1)2(n · h(n− 1) + 1− n)
)
= 2
n2(n+ 1)2
(
(n3 · h(n) + n2 · h(n)− n3)− (n3 · h(n− 1) + n2 − n3)
− (2n+ 1)(n · h(n− 1) + 1− n)
)
= 2
n2(n+ 1)2
(
n2 · h(n)− (2n+ 1)(n · h(n− 1) + 1− n)
)
= 2
n2(n+ 1)2
(
2n2 − n2 · h(n− 1)− n · h(n− 1)− 1
)
.
Let qn = n2(2 − h(n − 1)) − n · h(n − 1) − 1 for n. Then the sign of qn
and the sign of ϕ˜(Pn+1)− ϕ˜(Pn) are the same. We also note that qn is always
negative for n ≥ 3 and positive for n = 2. Thus, we obtain ϕ˜(P2) < ϕ˜(P3), and
ϕ˜(Pn) > ϕ˜(Pn+1) for n ≥ 3. uunionsq
Lemma 2. For the optimal partition C∗ of a path Pn and coalition C ∈ C∗, G[C]
is either P2, P3 or P4.
Proof. We first observe that the candidates for G[C] are only P2, P3, P4, P5 or
an isolated vertex. This is because we can increase the social welfare by dividing
Pn for n > 5 to them from Corollary 1, Lemma 1, and ϕ(Pn) < n/2 for n > 5.
Next, we show that P5 is not included in the candidate. Since we have
ϕ(P5) = 77/30 < 8/3 = ϕ(P2) + ϕ(P3), we can increase the social welfare by
dividing P5 into two coalition V (P2) and V (P3), if there is a coalition such that
G[C] = P5. Therefore P5 is not included in the candidate for G[C].
Finally, we show that an isolated vertex is not the candidate. Suppose that
an isolated vertex is included in the optimal partition of Pn. Because a graph
is a path graph, any isolated vertex is adjacent to at least one vertex. Now, we
suppose that an isolated vertex is adjacent to a coalition that consists of another
isolated vertex, P2, P3, or P4. In the following, we show the contradiction for
these four cases.
1. If an isolated vertex v is adjacent to an isolated vertex u, we set ϕ(Pn, C∗ \
{{u}, {v}} ∪ {{u, v}}) = ϕ(Pn, C∗)− 0 + 1. This contradicts the optimality
of ϕ(Pn, C∗).
2. If an isolated vertex v is adjacent to a vertex of the coalition V (P2), we set
ϕ(Pn, C∗ \ {V (P2), {v}} ∪ {V (P3}) = ϕ(Pn, C∗)− 1 + 5/3. This contradicts
the optimality of ϕ(Pn, C∗).
3. If an isolated vertex v is adjacent to a vertex of the coalition V (P3), we set
ϕ(Pn, C∗ \{V (P3), {v}}∪{V (P4}) = ϕ(Pn, C∗)−5/3+13/6. This contradicts
the optimality of ϕ(Pn, C∗).
4. If an isolated vertex v is adjacent to a vertex of the coalition V (P4), we set
ϕ(Pn, C∗ \ {V (P4), {v}} ∪ {V (P2), V (P3)}) = ϕ(Pn, C∗) − 13/6 + 8/3. This
contradicts the optimality of ϕ(Pn, C∗).
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In any case, an isolated vertex is not included in the optimal partition. Therefore,
G[C] is P2, P3 or P4 in the optimal partition of Pn. uunionsq
Theorem 1. The following partitions are optimal partitions of path Pn:
1. C = {{v3i−2, v3i−1, v3i} | 1 ≤ i ≤ n/3} if n ≡ 0 (mod 3),
2. C = {{v1, v2, v3, v4}, {v3i+2, v3i+3, v3i+4} | 1 ≤ i ≤ (n− 4)/3} if n ≡ 1
(mod 3), and
3. C = {{v1, v2}, {v3i, v3i+1, v3i+2} | 1 ≤ i ≤ (n− 2)/3} or {{v1, v2, v3, v4},
{v5, v6, v7, v8}, {v3i+6, v3i+7, v3i+8} | 1 ≤ i ≤ (n− 8)/3
}
if n ≡ 2 (mod 3).
Proof. From Lemma 2, we only have to consider partitions that consist of P2,P3
or P4. Note that the order of coalitions in a path graph does not affect. Thus,
we can rearrange the order of coalitions in a path graph without changing the
social welfare. Now, we show that the optimal solution of Pn contains at most
two coalitions of V (P2). If three or more coalitions of V (P2) are included in
the optimal partition, we first rearrange three coalitions of V (P2) so that they
are consecutive without changing the social welfare. Next, we replace them
by consecutive two coalitions of V (P3). Because ϕ(P2) = 1, ϕ(P3) = 5/3 and
3 · ϕ(P2) = 3 < 10/3 = 2 · ϕ(P3), the social welfare increases. Similarly, we show
that the optimal partiton of Pn contains at most two coalitions of V (P4). If
three or more coalitions of V (P4) are included in the optimal partition, we first
rearrange three coalitions of V (P4) so that they are consecutive. Then, we change
them to consecutive four coalitions of V (P3). Because ϕ(P4) = 13/6, ϕ(P3) = 5/3
and 3 · ϕ(P4) = 13/2 < 20/3 = 4 · ϕ(P3), the social welfare also increases. Thus,
the optimal partition of Pn contains at most two coalitions of V (P2) and V (P4),
respectively.
Moreover, if both V (P2) and V (P4) are included in the optimal partition,
we rearrange one V (P2) and one V (P4) so that they are consecutive. Then, we
replace them by two consecutive consists of V (P3). Because ϕ(P2) + ϕ(P4) =
19/6 < 10/3 = 2 · ϕ(P3), the social welfare increases. Thus, both V (P2) and
V (P4) are not included in the optimal partition.
Finally, if the optimal partiton of Pn contains two coalitions of V (P2), we
rearrange them so that so that they are consecutive. Next, we change two V (P2)
into one V (P4). Because 2 · ϕ(P2) = 2 < 13/6 = ϕ(P4), the social welfare
increases. Thus, the optimal partition of Pn contains at most one coalition of
V (P2). Therefore, the optimal partition of Pn contains at most one coalition
of V (P2), at most two coalitions of V (P4). Moreover, it does not contain both
V (P2) and V (P4).
From the above discussion, we can identify the optimal partition of a path
graph Pn.
1. If n ≡ 0 (mod 3),
A partition C = {V (P3), . . . , V (P3)} satisfies the above conditions. That is,
the partition that consists of coalitions V (P3)’s is the optimal partition.
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2. If n ≡ 1 (mod 3),
A partition C = {V (P4), V (P3), . . . , V (P3)} is the only partition that satisfies
the above condition.
3. If n ≡ 2 (mod 3),
Partitions C = {V (P2), V (P3), . . . , V (P3)} and C = {V (P4), V (P4), V (P3),
. . . , V (P3)} satisfy the above conditions. The social welfare of the former is
1+(5/3) ·(n−2)/3 = (5n−1)/9 and the latter is (13/6) ·2+(5/3) ·(n−8)/3 =
(5n− 1)/9. Thus, both of them are optimal partitions.
uunionsq
8 Omitted proof in Section 4
Lemma 3. For tree T≤2n with diameter at most 2, n/2 ≤ ϕ(T≤2n ) ≤ 9n/16 holds.
Proof. Let ϕ(K1,n−1) and ϕ˜(K1,n−1) be the social welfare and the average social
welfare of the grand coalition ofK1,n−1, respectively. Then we can express them as
ϕ(K1,n−1) = (n− 1)(n+ 2)/2n and ϕ˜(K1,n−1) = (n− 1)(n+ 2)/2n2. Moreover,
we differentiate the average social welfare by n: dϕ˜(K1,n−1)/dn = (4− n)/2n3.
Therefore, the average social welfare is maximum when n = 4. By combining
Corollary 1, n/2 ≤ ϕ(K1,n−1) ≤ 9n/16 holds. uunionsq
Lemma 4. For tree T 3n with diameter 3, if k = 2 and ` ≥ 7, k ≥ 7 and ` = 2,
k > 3 and ` ≥ 3, or k ≥ 3 and ` > 3, ϕ(T 3n) < n/2 holds, and otherwise
ϕ(T 3n) ≥ n/2.
Proof. For T 3n , since the utilities of si, tj , u1 and u2 are U(si, V (T 3n)) = (1+k/2+
`/3)/n, U(tj , V (T 3n)) = (1+ `/2+ k/3)/n, U(u1, V (T 3n)) = ((k+1)+ `/2)/n and
U(u2, V (T 3n)) = ((`+ 1) + k/2)/n, respectively, the social welfare of the grand
coalition of T 3n ϕ(T 3n) is as follows:
ϕ(T 3n) =
k∑
i=1
U(si, V (T 3n)) +
∑`
j=1
U(tj , V (T 3n)) + U(u1, V (T 3n)) + U(u2, V (T 3n))
= 1
n
(
`(1 + `2 +
k
3 ) + k(1 +
k
2 +
`
3) + ((k + 1) +
`
2) + ((`+ 1) +
k
2 )
)
= 1
n
(k2
2 +
5k
2 +
`2
2 +
5`
2 +
2k`
3 + 2
)
.
Since n = k + `+ 2,
ϕ(T 3n)−
n
2 =
k2
2 +
5k
2 +
`2
2 +
5`
2 +
2k`
3 + 2
k + `+ 2 −
k + `+ 2
2
=
k2 + 5k + `2 + 5`+ 4k`3 + 4
2(k + `+ 2) −
(k + `+ 2)2
2(k + `+ 2)
= 12(k + `+ 2)(k + `−
2k`
3 )
= 13(k + `+ 2)
(
9
4 − (k −
3
2)(`−
3
2)
)
.
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Since k and ` are positive integers, if k = 2 and ` ≥ 7, k ≥ 7 and ` = 2, k > 3
and ` ≥ 3, or k ≥ 3 and ` > 3, it satisfies that ϕ(T 3n)− n/2 < 0, and otherwise
ϕ(T 3n)− n/2 ≥ 0. uunionsq
Lemma 5. For tree T 4n with diameter 4, ϕ(T 4n) ≥ n/2 holds if (k, αk) = (2, 2),
(2, 3), (3, 2), (4, 2), and otherwise ϕ(T 4n) < n/2 holds.
Proof. For T 4n , since αk =
∑k
i=1 `i, the utilities of v, ui and wi,j are denoted
by U(v, V (T 4n)) = k + αk/2, U(ui, V (T 4n)) = (`i + 1) + (k − 1)/2 + (αk − `i)/3
and U(wi,j , V (T 4n)) = 1 + `i/2 + (k − 1)/3 + (αk − `i)/4, respectively. Here, let
βk =
∑k
i=1 `
2
i , then the utilities of ui and wi,j can be expressed as follows:
k∑
i=1
U(ui, V (T 4n)) =
k∑
i=1
(
(`i + 1) +
k − 1
2 +
αk − `i
3
)
= kαk3 +
2αk
3 +
k2
2 +
k
2 ,
k∑
i=1
`i∑
j=1
U(wi,j , V (T 4n)) =
k∑
i=1
`i
(
1 + `i2 +
k − 1
3 +
αk − `i
4
)
= α
2
k
4 +
βk
4 +
kαk
3 +
2αk
3 .
Therefore, the social welfare of the grand coalition of T 4n ϕ(T 4n) is represented
as:
ϕ(T 4n) =
1
n
∑
v∈Vk
U(v, V )
= 1
n
(
k∑
i=1
U(ui, V (T 4n)) +
k∑
i=1
`i∑
j=1
U(wi,j , V (T 4n)) + k + αk/2)
= 1
n
(
α2k
4 +
βk
4 +
2kαk
3 +
11αk
6 +
k2
2 +
3k
2
)
.
Since n = k + αk + 1,
ϕ(T 4n)− n2 =
1
2(k + αk + 1)
(
α2k
2 +
βk
2 +
4kαk
3 +
11αk
3 + k
2 + 3k
)
− (k + αk + 1)
2
2(k + αk + 1)
= 12(k + αk + 1)
(
βk
2 −
α2k
2 −
2kαk
3 +
5αk
3 + k − 1
)
.
Let ` = (`1, . . . , `k). Since βk−α2k = −
∑
i,j∈[k],i6=j 2`i`j and 1/(2(k+α+1)) > 0,
if we define f(k, `) = −∑i,j∈[k],i6=j `i`j−2kαk/3+5αk/3+k−1, then the sign of
f(k, `) and the sign of ϕ(T 4n)− n/2 are the same. Because αk ≥ 2 and `1, `2 ≥ 1,
∂f(k, `)
∂k
= 1− 2αk3 < 0.
Moreover, since k ≥ 2 and ∑j∈[k]\{i} `j ≥ 1,
∂f(k, `)
∂`i
= 53 −
2k
3 −
∑
j∈[k]\{i}
`j < 0.
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Thus, f(k, `) is a decreasing function related to k, `1, . . . , `k. Therefore, the case
that f(k, `) ≥ 0 for k ≥ 2 and `1, `2 ≥ 1 is (k, `1, `2, `3, . . . , `k) = (2, 1, 1, 0, . . . , 0),
(2, 1, 1, 1, . . . , 0), (3, 1, 1, 0, . . . , 0), (4, 1, 1, 0, . . . , 0). Thus,
ϕ(T 4n)−
n
2
{
≥ 0 (k, αk) = (2, 2), (2, 3), (3, 2), (4, 2).
< 0 otherwise.
uunionsq
Lemma 6. For tree Tµn with diameter µ ≥ 5, ϕ(Tµn ) < n/2 holds.
Proof. We show that ϕ(Tµn ) < n/2 by using mathematical induction. We observe
that there always exists a path Pµ+1 with diameter µ in Tµn . By adding vertex and
edges to Pµ+1 without changing the diameter, we can express any Tµn . Then we
show that ϕ(Tµn ) < n/2 in the process of adding vertices and edges. By Lemma 1
and ϕ(P6)− (µ+ 1)/2 = 29/10− 6/2 < 0, the difference between ϕ(Pµ+1) and
(µ+1)/2 is ϕ(Pµ+1)− (µ+1)/2 < 0 for Pµ+1. We assume that Tµk−1 < (k− 1)/2
holds. Let u ∈ V (Tµk−1) be a vertex that does not change the diameter of Tµk−1
even if we connect a new vertex w to u in Tµk−1. Moreover, let T
µ
k be a tree such
that a new vertex w is connected to such vertex u and (w, u) are added to Tµk−1.
Here, the social welfare of Tµk consists of the social welfare with respect to a new
vertex w and the social welfare with in k − 1 vertices in Tµk−1. The later can
be represented as (k − 1)ϕ(Tµk−1)/k. Let pk be the former one. Then we have
ϕ(Tµk ) = (k − 1)ϕ(Tµk−1)/k + pk.
Let n2 and n3 be the number of verticies at distance two and three from w in
Tµk , respectively, and n≥4 be the number of verticies at distance four and more.
Then pk is represented as
pk =
2 + n2 + 2n33 + · · ·
k
<
2 + n2 + 2n33 +
n≥4
2
k
. (1)
Moreover, since k = n2 + n3 + n≥4 + 2 and ϕ(Tµk−1) < (k − 1)/2, it holds that
k − 1
k
ϕ(Tµk−1) <
(k − 1)2
2k =
(n2 + n3 + n≥4 + 1)2
2(n2 + n3 + n≥4 + 2)
. (2)
From inequalities (1) and (2), it holds that
ϕ(Tµk ) =
k − 1
k
ϕ(Tµk−1) + pk <
(n2 + n3 + n≥4 + 1)2
2(n2 + n3 + n≥4 + 2)
+
2 + n2 + 2n33 +
n≥4
2
n2 + n3 + n≥4 + 2
=
(n2 + n3 + n≥4 + 1)2 + 4 + 2n2 + 4n33 + n≥4
2(n2 + n3 + n≥4 + 2)
.
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Finally,
ϕ(Tµk )−
k
2 <
(n2 + n3 + n≥4 + 1)2 + 4 + 2n2 + 4n33 + n≥4
2(n2 + n3 + n≥4 + 2)
− (n2 + n3 + n≥4 + 2)
2
2(n2 + n3 + n≥4 + 2)
=
4 + 2n2 + 4n33 + n≥4 − 2n2 − 2n3 − 2n≥4 − 3
2(n2 + n3 + n≥4 + 2)
=
1− 2n33 − n≥4
2(n2 + n3 + n≥4 + 2)
< 0.
Note that since the diameter of Tµk is µ ≥ 5, it holds that n3, n≥4 ≥ 1. uunionsq
Lemma 7. Any optimal partition of a tree T does not contain a coalition that
consists of a tree T≥4 with diameter at least 4.
Proof. We consider coalitions with (1) diameter 4 and (2) diameter at least 5.
1. From Lemma 5, if (k, αk) = (2, 2), (2, 3), (3, 2), (4, 2), it holds that ϕ(T 4) ≥
n/2. For each case, we check whether there is a partition C which satisfies
ϕ(T 4) < ϕ(T 4, C).
(a) If (k, αk) = (2, 2), we set C = {{v, u1, w1,1}, {u2, w2,1}}. Since ϕ(T 4) =
77/30 < 8/3 = ϕ(T 4, C), the optimal solution of T does not contain T 4
as a coalition.
(b) If (k, αk) = (2, 3), we set C = {{v, u1, w1,1, w1,2}, {u2, w2,1}}. Since
ϕ(T 4) = 3 < 10/3 = ϕ(T 4, C), the optimal solution of T does not
contain T 4 as a coalition.
(c) If (k, αk) = (3, 2), we set C = {{v, u1, u2, w1,1}, {u3, w3,1}}. Since ϕ(T 4) =
109/36 < 10/3 = ϕ(T 4, C), any optimal solution of T does not contain
T 4 as a coalition.
(d) If (k, αk) = (4, 2), we set C = {{v, u3, u4}, {u1, w1,1}, {u2, w2,1}}. Since
ϕ(T 4) = 7/2 < 11/3 = ϕ(T 4, C), the optimal solution of T does not
contain T 4 as a coalition.
2. Since there exists a partition C such that ϕ(T≥5, C) ≥ n/2 by Proposition 2
and ϕ(T≥5) < n/2 by Lemma 6, any optimal solution of T does not contain
T≥5 as a coalition.
uunionsq
Lemma 8. Let C∗ be the optimal partition of tree Tn. Then, the subgraph G[C]
induced by C ∈ C∗ is one of the following: (1) a star K1,|C|−1 (see Figure 3), (2)a
path P4 of length 3 (see Figure 4), and (3)a tree T 35 of size five with diameter 3
(see Figure 5).
Proof. From Lemma 7, there is no coalition C in the optimal partition such that
the diameter of G[C] is at least 4. Thus, we consider diameter at most 2, and
diameter 3.
diameter at most 2. A tree with diameter at most 2 is a star.
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diameter 3. From Corollary 1, we only have to consider a tree of social welfare
more than n/2. By Lemma 4, if (k, `) = (1, `′), (2, 2), (2, 3), (2, 4), (2, 5), (2, 6),
(3, 3), (3, 2), (4, 2), (5, 2), (6, 2), (k′, 1), a tree T 3 with diameter 3 satisfies
ϕ(T 3) ≥ |V (T 3)|/2. Here, by using the fact that k and ` are symmetric, we
only consider (1, `′), (2, 2), (2, 3), (2, 4), (2, 5), (2, 6) and (3, 3).
Case:(k, `) = (1, `′). From the fact that ϕ(P2) = 1 and ϕ(K1,`′) = `′(`′ +
3)/2(`′ + 1), if C = {{s1, u1}, {u2, t1, . . . , t`′}}, the social welfare ϕ(T )
and ϕ(T, C) are respectively represented as
ϕ(T ) =
`′2 + 19`′3 + 10
2(`′ + 3) and ϕ(T, C) =
`′2 + 5`′ + 2
2(`′ + 1) .
Thus,
ϕ(T )− ϕ(T, C) = (`
′ + 1)(`′2 + 19`′3 + 10)− (`′ + 3)(`′2 + 5`′ + 2)
2(`′ + 1)(`′ + 3)
= − (`
′ − 2)
3(`′ + 1) .
If `′ ∈ {1, 2}, the social welfare of the grand coalition is actually at least
the one of C. Moreover, if `′ ≥ 3, the social welfare of C is more than
the grand coalition. Therefore, candidates for a coalition in the optimal
partition are only T 35 and P4.
Case:(k, `) = (2, 2). If C = {{s1, s2, u1}, {u2, t1, t2}}, ϕ(T 3) = 28/9 < 10/3
= ϕ(T 3, C). Thus, a tree with diameter three and (k, `) = (2, 2) is not
candidate for coalition in the optimal partition.
Case:(k, `) = (2, 3). If we set C = {{s1, s2, u1}, {u2, t1, t2, t3}}, ϕ(T 3) =
25/7 < 47/12 = ϕ(T 3, C) holds.
Case:(k, `) = (2, 4). If we set C = {{s1, s2, u1}, {u2, t1, t2, t3, t4}}, ϕ(T 3) =
97/24 < 67/15 = ϕ(T 3, C) holds.
Case:(k, `) = (2, 5). If we set C = {{s1, s2, u1}, {u2, t1, t2, t3, t4, t5}},
ϕ(T 3) = 122/27 < 5 = ϕ(T 3, C) holds.
Case:(k, `) = (2, 6). If we set C = {{s1, s2, u1}, {u2, t1, t2, t3, t4, t5, t6}},
ϕ(T 3) = 5 < 116/21 = ϕ(T 3, C) holds.
Case:(k, `) = (3, 3). If we set C = {{s1, s2, s3, u1}, {u2, t1, t2, t3}},
ϕ(T 3) = 4 < 9/2 = ϕ(T 3, C) holds.
Since a tree with diameter 3 is P4 if (k, `) = (1, 1) and T 35 if (k, `) =
(2, 1), (1, 2), candidates for a coalition in the optimal partition are P4 and T 35
Now, we know that G[C] is one of ({v}, ∅), K1,|C|−1, P4 and T 35 for C ∈ C∗.
Finally, we show that optimal partition does not contain an isolated vertex
({v}, ∅) as a coalition in a tree.
As with Proposition 2, we assume that an isolated vertex v exists in optimal
partition C∗ and lead to contradiction. In the following, we assume that an
isolated vertex v is adjacent to another isolated vertex, the center of a star, one
of leaves of a star, a vertex in P4, and a vertex in T 35 .
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An isolated vertex v is adjacent to another isolated vertex u. It is incon-
sistent as the social welfare increases by setting partition to C∗ \ {{u}, {v}}∪
{{u, v}}.
An isolated vertex v is adjacent to the center of star K1,f . Since
ϕ(K1,f+1) = f/2 + 3/2 − 1/(f + 2) > f/2 + 1 − 1/(f + 1) = ϕ(K1,f ),
the social welfare of C∗ \ ({V (K1,f ), {v}}) ∪ ({V (K1,f+1)}) is larger than C∗.
This is contradiction.
An isolated vertex v is adjacent to one of leaves of star K1,f . In the case
of f = 1, 2, it is the same as the case of a path. Thus, this is contradic-
tion. For f ≥ 3, we chose one leaf u in K1,f . Since ϕ(K1,f−1) + ϕ(P2) =
(f2 + 3f − 2)/2f > (f2 + 3f)/2(f + 1) = ϕ(K1,f ), if we set C′ = C∗ \
({V (K1,f ), {v}}) ∪ ({V (K1,f ) \ {u}, {u, v}}), ϕ(G, C′) > ϕ(G, C∗). This is
contradiction.
An isolated vertex v is adjacent to P4. If v is adjacent to a leaf in P4, this is
contradiction by Lemma 2. If v is adjacent not to a leaf, since ϕ(T 35 ) = 8/3 >
13/6 = ϕ(P4), if we set C′ = C∗\({{V (P4), {v}})∪{T 35 }, ϕ(G, C′) > ϕ(G, C∗).
This is contradiction.
An isolated vertex v is adjacent to T 35 . We consider the following four cases.
An isolated vertex v is adjacent to s1. Since ϕ(P3) + ϕ(P3) = 10/3 >
8/3 = ϕ(T 35 ), if we set C′ = C∗ \ ({V (T 35 ), {v}}) ∪ ({V (P3), V (P3)}),
ϕ(G, C′) > ϕ(G, C∗). This is contradiction.
An isolated vertex v is adjacent to u1. Since ϕ(P3) + ϕ(P3) = 10/3 >
8/3 = ϕ(T 35 ), if we set C′ = C∗ \ ({V (T 35 ), {v}}) ∪ ({V (P3), V (P3)}),
ϕ(G, C′) > ϕ(G, C∗). This is contradiction.
An isolated vertex v is adjacent to u2. Since ϕ(K1,3)+ϕ(P2) = 13/4 >
8/3 = ϕ(T 35 ), if we set C′ = C∗ \ ({V (T 35 ), {v}}) ∪ ({V (K1,3), V (P2)}),
ϕ(G, C′) > ϕ(G, C∗). This is contradiction.
An isolated vertex v is adjacent to t1 or t2. Since ϕ(P2) + ϕ(P4)
= 19/6 > 8/3 = ϕ(T 35 ), if we set C′ = C∗ \ ({V (T 35 ), {v}}) ∪ ({V (P2),
V (P4)}), ϕ(G, C′) > ϕ(G, C∗). This is contradiction.
All the cases contradict the optimality of C∗. Therefore, optimal partition C∗
does not include an isolated vertex. This completes the proof. uunionsq
9 Omitted proof in Section 5
In this section, we prove Theorem 3.
Theorem 3. MaxSWP is NP-hard even for 4-regular graphs.
9.1 Reduction
In this subsection, we give a reduction from M3XSAT(3L). An instance ψ of
M3XSAT(3L) forms a set of clause, say S1, . . . , Sm, where each clause consists of
three literals from x1, x2, . . . , xn, and each xi appears three times in Sj ’s. Note
that we can regard a clause as just a 3-set because of the monotonicity. Since
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Fig. 7. Graph Gψ Fig. 8. (single) triangle, double triangle,
and triple triangle
∑m
j=1 |Sj | = 3m and the number of the total occurrences of literals is 3n, n = m
holds. From ψ, we construct a 4-regular graph Gψ = (V (Gψ), E(Gψ)) from a given
instance of M3XSAT(3L). First, we prepare a vertex set Vxi = {x(1)i , x(2)i , x(3)i }
that corresponds to literal xi. We call these literal vertices. We also prepare
a vertex set VSj = {S(1)j , S(2)j } that corresponds to 3-set Sj . These are called
clause vertices. Here, x(1)i , x
(2)
i and x
(3)
i correspond to the appearances of xi. For
example, if x4 appears in C2, C3 and C5, x(1)4 , x
(2)
4 and x
(3)
4 are associated with
C2, C3 and C5, respectively. The vertex set of Gψ consists of Vxi ’s and VSj ’s,
that is, V (Gψ) =
⋃n
i=1 Vxi ∪
⋃m
j=1 VSj . Thus |V (Gψ)| = 3n + 2m = 5n holds.
We connect these vertices by the following manner: (1) Vxi forms a triangle,
that is, there are three edges (x(1)i , x
(2)
i ), (x
(2)
i , x
(3)
i ) and (x
(3)
i , x
(1)
i ), (2) vertices
in VSj have an edge, that is, there is an edge (S
(1)
j , S
(2)
j ), and (3) vertices in
Vxi are connected with vertices in their corresponding VSj . For example, if x
(2)
i
appears in Sj , there are edges (x(2)i , S
(1)
j ) and (x
(2)
i , S
(2)
j ) (see Figure 7). We call
a subgraph consists of VSj and its corresponding three literal vertices a clause
gadget. It is easy to see that the degree of every vertex of Gψ is 4.
We can show the following important property of this Gψ. A triangle is a cycle
with 3 vertices, and a double triangle is a graph that consists of two triangles
sharing an edge, a triple triangle is a graph that consists of three triangles sharing
an edge. See Figure 8.
Lemma 9. If a coalition C of Gψ satisfies ϕ˜(G[C]) ≥ 2/3, C forms one of the
following: triangle, double triangle and triple triangle. The average social welfare
of triangle, double triangle and triple triangle are 2/3 = 0.666 · · · , 11/16 = 0.6875
and 17/25 = 0.68, respectively.
To this end, we show several sub-lemmas. The first one is very simple, but it
gives an insight of a general property of average social welfare.
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Lemma 10. For a graph G of k vertices and ` edges, ϕ˜(G) ≤ (k2 − k + 2`)/2k2
holds.
Proof. For a vertex v, we partition the vertex set V of G as (V0, V1, V2, . . . , Vk),
where Vi is the set of vertices i distant from v. Let dv denote the degree of vertex
v. Then, V0 = {v} and |V1| = dv. By the definition of the utility, we have
U(v,G) = 1
k
∑
i=1
|Vi|
i
≤ 1
k
(|V1|+
∑
i=2
|Vi|
2 ) =
1
k
(
dv +
k − dv − 1
2
)
= dv + k − 12k ,
and thus the following holds:
ϕ˜(G) ≤ 12k2
∑
v∈V
(dv + k − 1) = 2`+ k(k − 1)2k2
The last equality comes from the handshaking lemma,
∑
v∈V dv = 2`. uunionsq
By Lemma 10, we obtain the following.
Lemma 11. For a 4-regular graph G = (V,E) with |V | ≥ 9, the average social
welfare of the grand coalition is at most 2/3, i.e., ϕ˜(G) ≤ 2/3 holds. Furthermore,
for a coalition C that is not a grand coalition of G, if |C| ≥ 9, ϕ˜(G[C]) < 2/3
holds.
Proof. By the regularity of G, 4|V | = 2|E| holds. Then by Lemma 10, we have
ϕ˜(G) ≤ |V |
2 − |V |+ 4|V |
2|V |2 =
1
2 +
3
2k ≤
2
3 .
For a coalition C that is not a grand, suppose that G[C] is a graph with k vertices
and ` edges. Since G[C] contains a vertex whose degree is at most 4, we have
4k > 2`. Thus, by the similar arguement, we have
ϕ˜(G[C]) ≤ k
2 − k + 2`
2k2 <
2
3 .
uunionsq
The next one is not about a general graph but about Gψ.
Lemma 12. For a coalition C in Gψ, ϕ˜(Gψ[C]) < 2/3 holds if |C| = 6, 7, 8.
Proof. Throughout the proof, we denote |C| by k and the number of edges of
Gψ[C] by `.
(k = 6) From Lemma 10, if k = 6 and ` < 9, ϕ˜(Gψ[C]) < 2/3 holds. We prove
the statement by showing that Gψ[C] contains at most 8 edges. We show this
by contradiction; we assume that Gψ[C] has 9 or more edges. Then, the average
degree is ` · 2/k ≥ 3; it forms a 3-regular graph or a graph with maximum degree
is 4.
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Case:3-regular graph. Due to k = 6, Gψ[C] contains at least one clause vertex.
If two clause vertices in a clause gadget are contained in Gψ[C], exactly two
literal vertices in the same clause gadget should be contained, otherwise it
violates 3-regularity. However, if the degrees of these literal vertices are 3,
the degrees of two extra vertices cannot be 3. Thus only one clause vertex
in a clause gadget is contained in Gψ[C]. Then the three literal vertices in
the clause gadget should be contained, but again the degrees of these literal
vertices cannot be 3 by adding two extra vertices. From these, Gψ[C] cannot
be a 3-regular graph.
Case:graph with a vertex of degree 4. We consider the case where Gψ[C]
contains a clause vertex of degree 4 or does not include a clause vertex of
degree 4.
Case:including a clause vertex of degree 4. It contains all the vertices
of a clause gadget, and the remaining one vertex chosen outside the clause
gadget. However, ` ≤ 8 is obtained for any case.
Case:not including a clause vertex of degree 4. The induced subgraph
contains three or four vertices in a clause gadget. Here, if we do not in-
clude two clause vertices of the clause gadget, there is no vertex of degree
4. For this reason, the induced subgraph contains two clause vertices in
the clause gadget. Here, if the induced subgraph include three literal
vertices in the clause gadget, a literal vertex can be of degree 4. Without
lose generality, let v(1)xi be such a literal vertex. Since the degree of v
(1)
xi
is 4, other two vertices v(2)xi , v
(3)
xi ∈ Vxi must be included in the same
induced subgraph.
Now, the induced subgraph contains five vertices: two clause vertices and
three literal vertices, we only consider the remaining one vertex. If we
choose a clause vertex adjacent to either v(2)xi or v
(3)
xi , the number of edges
is at most 7. If we do not choose a clause vertex adjacent to either v(2)xi
or v(3)xi , the number of edges is at most 8.
(k = 7) From Lemma 10, if k = 7 and ` ≥ 12, ϕ˜(Gψ[C]) ≥ 2/3 holds, but if
k = 7, we show ` < 12. Here we assume that there is a induced subgraph, where
` ≥ 12. The induced subgraph contains a vertex of degree 4 from 12 ·2/7 > 3.4. In
the following, we will investigate separately when the induced subgraph contains
a clause vertex of degree 4 or a clause vertex of degree at most 3.
Case:graph with a vertex of degree 4. Since the induced subgraph contains
all the vertices of a clause gadget, the number of edges is 7. Therefore, we
consider whether there are vertices where the number of edges is 12 by
including the remaining 2 vertices. There are three ways to include vertices,
but none of them will exceed the number of edges by more than 12.
Case:graph with a vertex of degree 3. The induced subgraph contains three
or four vertices in a clause gadget. Here, if the induced subgraph does not
include two clause vertices of a clause gadget, there is no vertex of degree 4.
For this reason, the induced subgraph includes two clause vertices within a
clause gadget. If a coalition contains three vertices in a clause gadget, the
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vertex of degree 4 is the literal vertex in a clause gadget. That is, since the
coalition contains all vertices adjacent to the literal vertex, we consider only
the remaining two vertices. It may be possible to include two vertices in other
gadget adjacent to literal vertices of degree 4, but the number of edges is
at most 9. If the induced subgraph includes four vertices in a clause gadget,
two clause vertices are included as well as including the three vertices in a
clause gadget. Therefore, we only consider the remaining one vertex. In this
case, there are two combinations, but in either case the number of edges is
at most 9.
(k = 8) From Lemma 10, if k = 8 and ` ≥ 15, ϕ˜(Gψ[C]) ≥ 2/3 holds, but
if k = 8, we show ` < 15. we assume that the induced subgraph satisfy ` ≥ 15.
Since the Gψ is two-connected four-regular, the degree of the subgraph is at most
4 and includes at least two vertices of the degree of at most 3. Therefore, the
maximum edges of the subgraph with the number of eight vertices is 15 from
((8− 2) · 4 + 2 · 3)/2 = 15, but we show that there is no subgraph that realizes
this number of edges. Suppose that G[C] includes six vertices of degree 4 and
two vertices of degree 3. Here, we consider the case where the induced subgraph
contains a clause vertex of degree 4, or a clause vertex of degree at most 3.
Case:graph with a vertex of degree 4. The induced subgraph contains all
the vertices in a clause gadget. Therefore, we think about the remaining
three vertices. In order to make the degree of literal vertex in a clause gadget
be equal to or lager than 3, the induced subgraph includes literal vertex of
other gadget, but we can not make degree of literal vertex of other gadget 3
or more. This is contradiction.
Case:graph with a vertex of degree 3. The induced subgraph includes two
clause vertices and two literal vertices in a clause gadget. Here, the degree
of the clause vertex is 3, that is, the vertices other than the clause vertices
are degree 4. However, in order to make degree of literal vertex in a clause
gadget 4, the induced subgraph need include literal vertex of other gadget.
Moreover, in order to make degree of literal vertex in a clause gadget 4, the
induced subgraph need include clause vertex. This is contradiction.
uunionsq
Lemma 13. For any coalition C ∈ C of Gψ, ϕ˜(Gψ[C]) ≤ 11/16 holds.
Proof. From Lemmas 11 and 12, if k ≥ 6, ϕ˜(Gψ[C]) ≤ 2/3 holds. We consider the
average social welfare for k = 2, 3, 4, 5. If k = 2, the upper bound of the average
utility is 1/2. Moreover, if k = 3, the average social welfare of a complete graph
of size 3 is maximum and 2/3. If k = 4, the average social welfare of a clique of
size 4 minus one edge is maximum in Gψ since it is two-connected four-regular
and it does not contain a clique of size 4. In this case, the average social welfare
of a clique of size 4 minus one edge is 11/16. Since the average social welfare
on other subgraphs in Gψ of size 4 is at most 11/16, maximum average social
welfare of subgraph in Gψ of size 4 is also 11/16. If k = 5, there are 7 induced
subgraphs of Gψ. Since the upper bound of the average utility is proportional
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to the number of edges from Lemma 9, we only consider the case of the largest
number of edges. Such an induced subgraph is a triple triangle corresponding to
a clause gadget. The average social welfare of a triple triangle is 17/25. Since
the average social welfare on other subgraphs in Gψ of size 5 is at most 17/25,
maximum average social welfare of subgraph in in Gψ of size 5 is also 17/25.
Therefore, for any coalition C ∈ C of Gψ, ϕ˜(Gψ[C]) ≤ 11/16 holds.
uunionsq
9.2 NP-hardness of MaxSWP
From Lemma 9, we prove the following lemma.
Lemma 14. An instance ψ of M3XSAT(3L) is a yes-instance if and only if Gψ
has a partition C such that ϕ(Gψ, C) = 41n/12.
Proof. (⇒) Assume that there is a truth assignment, and we construct a partition
of Gψ from the assignment. In the partition, each Vxi with true xi forms a coalition
as a triangle, and each VSj together with vertices of false literals forms a coalition
as a double triangle. For example, suppose that Sj = {x(1)1 , x(1)2 , x(1)3 } and Sj is
satisfied by x(1)1 (actually xi). We then consider a coalition {S(1)j , S(2)j , x(1)2 , x(1)3 }
for VSj which forms a double triangle. Since the truth assignment satisfies all the
clauses, each VSj is a part of coalition of size 4. Literal vertices Vxi themselves
form a coalition if xi = 1, and otherwise they are included in Cj ’s. Since the
utility of the coalition of a double triangle is 11/4 and the utility of a triangle is
2, the utility of the reduced graph is ϕ(Gψ, C)=11n/4 + 2 · (n/3) = 41n/12.
(⇐) Assume that there exists a partition C of Gψ whose social welfare is at
least 41n/12, and the average social welfare is at least (41n/12)/(5n) = 41/60 =
0.683 · · · . This and Lemma 9 imply that C contains at least one double triangle.
Notice that a coalition can form a double triangle only in a clause gadget. If a
clause gadget contains a coalition of a double triangle, one literal vertex is left.
Since such a literal vertex belongs to a coalition of a subgraph of a triangle, its
utility is at most 2/3. Again, by Lemma 9, the average social welfare of a vertex
not included in double triangle is at most 17/25. From these, if C contains p
double triangles, the social welfare is at most
11
16 · 4p+
2
3 · p+
17
25 · 5(n− p) =
17
5 n+
(
41
12 −
17
5
)
p.
Since the social welfare of C is at least 41n/12 by the assumption, we have
17
5 n+
(
41
12 −
17
5
)
p ≥ 41n12 ,
and thus p ≥ n holds. On the other hand, p is the number of double triangles,
and it is at most n. It follows that p = n and every clause gadget contains a
double triangle as a coalition in C. Furthermore, a literal vertex not included in a
double triangle belongs to a coalition of a triangle, which corresponds to a literal
xi. Then by assigning true to such xi, every clause gadget includes exactly one
true literal, which is a solution of M3XSAT(3L). uunionsq
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By this Lemma 14 and the NP-hardness of M3XSAT(3L), we complete the
proof of Theorem 3.
